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Abstract
We consider quantum cryptographic schemes where the carriers of informa-
tion are 3-state particles. One protocol uses four mutually unbiased bases
and appears to provide better security than obtainable with 2-state carriers.
Another possible method allows quantum states to belong to more than one
basis. The security is not better, but many curious features arise.
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When Samuel Morse invented the telegraph, he devised for it an alphabet consisting
of three symbols: dash, dot, and space. More modern communication methods use binary
signals, conventionally called 0 and 1. Information theory, whose initial goal was to improve
communication efficiency, naturally introduced binary digits (bits) as its accounting units.
However, the theory can easily be reformulated in terms of ternary digits (trits) 0, 1, 2, or
larger sets of symbols [1]. For example, instead of bytes (sets of 8 bits) representing 256
ordinary characters, we would have “trytes” (5 trits) for 243 characters. An ordinary text
would thus be encoded into a string of trits. If we wish to encrypt the latter, this can be
done by adding to it (modulo 3) a random string, called key , known only to legitimate users.
Decrypting is then performed by subtracting that key (modulo 3).
The aim of quantum cryptography [2] is to generate a secret key by using quantum
carriers for the initial communication between distant parties (conventionally called Alice
and Bob). The simplest methods use 2-state systems, such as polarized photons. Orthogonal
states represent bit values 0 and 1. One may use either two [2] or three [3,4] orthogonal
bases, chosen in such a way that any basis vectors |ej〉 and |eµ〉 belonging to different bases
satisfy |〈ej, eµ〉|2 = 1/2. Such bases are called mutually unbiased [5,6]. As a consequence,
if an eavesdropper (Eve) uses the wrong basis, she gets no information at all and causes
maximal disturbance (error rate 1/2) to the transmission, thereby revealing her presence.
In this Letter, we consider 3-state systems as the quantum carriers for cryptographic
key distribution. For example, one may use “biphotons” [7], namely photon pairs in sym-
metric Fock states |0, 2〉, |2, 0〉, and |1, 1〉. Biphotons can easily be produced with present
technology, and detecting arbitrary linear combinations of them will probably be possible
soon. (Another possibility would be to use four states of a pair of photons [8], but here we
consider only 3-state systems.)
Following the method of refs. [3,4], we introduce four mutually unbiased bases. Let |α〉,
|β〉, and |γ〉 be the unit vectors of one of the bases. Another basis is obtained by a discrete
Fourier transform,
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|α′〉 = (|α〉+ |β〉+ |γ〉)/√3,
|β ′〉 = (|α〉+ e2pii/3|β〉+ e−2pii/3|γ〉)/√3,
|γ′〉 = (|α〉+ e−2pii/3|β〉+ e2pii/3|γ〉)/√3.
(1)
The two other bases can be taken as
(e2pii/3|α〉+ |β〉+ |γ〉)/
√
3 and cyclic perm., (2)
and
(e−2pii/3|α〉+ |β〉+ |γ〉)/
√
3 and cyclic perm.. (3)
Any basis vectors |ej〉 and |eµ〉 belonging to different bases now satisfy |〈ej, eµ〉|2 = 1/3.
The protocol for establishing a secret key is the usual one. Alice randomly chooses one
of the 12 vectors and sends to Bob a signal whose quantum state is represented by that
vector. Bob randomly chooses one of the four bases and “measures” the signal (that is,
Bob tests whether the signal is one of the basis vectors). Having done that, Bob publicly
reveals which basis he chose, but not the result he obtained. Alice then reveals whether her
vector belongs to that basis. If it does, Alice and Bob share the knowledge of one trit. If
it does not, that transmission was useless. This procedure is repeated until Alice and Bob
have obtained a long enough key. They will then have to sacrifice some of the trits for error
correction and privacy amplification [9] (we shall not discuss these points, which are the
same as in all cryptographic protocols, except that we have to use trits instead of bits, and
therefore parity checks become triality checks, that is, sums modulo 3).
Consider the simplest eavesdropping strategy: Eve intercepts a particle, measures it,
and resends to Bob the state that she found. In 3/4 of the cases, she uses a wrong basis,
gets no information, and causes maximal disturbance to the transmission: Bob’s error rate
(that is, the probability of a wrong identification of the trit value) is 2/3. On the average,
over all transmissions, Eve gets IE = 1/4 of a trit and Bob’s error rate is EB = 1/2. (It
is natural to measure Eve’s information in trits, since Bob gets one trit for each successful
transmission.) These results may be compared to those obtained by using 2-state systems.
3
With only two bases as in ref. [2] and with the same simple eavesdropping strategy, Eve
learns on the average 1/2 of a bit for each transmitted bit, and Bob’s error rate is 1/4. If we
use three bases as in [3,4], these numbers become 1/3. Thus, with the present method, Eve
learns a smaller fraction of the information and causes a larger disturbance. It is likely that
this is also true in presence of more sophisticated eavesdropping strategies, such as using an
ancilla to gently probe the transmission without completely disrupting it. When people seek
Eve’s “optimal” eavesdropping strategy [10], their criterion usually is the maximal value of
IE/EB.
Do the above results mean that using 3-state systems improves the cryptographic secu-
rity? The answer depends on which aim we seek to achieve. If Alice and Bob simply wish
to be warned that an eavesdropper is active, and in that case they will use another commu-
nication channel, then obviously the highest possible ratio EB/IE is desirable. Eve can at
most conceal her presence by intercepting only a small fraction x of the transmissions, such
that xEB is less than the natural error rate, but then IE is reduced by the same factor, and
Eve’s illicit information can be eliminated by classical privacy amplification [9].
However it may be that Alice and Bob have no alternative channel to use and privacy
amplification is their only possibility of fighting the eavesdropper. In that case, it is known
[11,12] that secure communication can in principle be achieved if Bob’s mutual information
with Alice, IB, is larger than Eve’s IE. Note that even if Bob and Eve have the same error
rate, as in one of the above examples, IE > IB. The reason is that Eve knows whether Alice
and Bob used the same basis, and therefore which ones of her data are correct and which
ones are worthless. On the other hand, Bob can only compare with Alice a subset of data,
so as to measure his mean error rate EB, and from the latter deduce the Shannon entropy
of his string. For 2-state systems, assuming all bit values equally probable, he obtains
IB = 1 + (1−EB) log2(1− EB) + EB log2EB, (4)
and likewise for 3-state systems,
IB = 1 + (1−EB) log3(1− EB) + EB log3(EB/2). (5)
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Numerical results, in bits and trits respectively, will be given in Table II at the end of this
Letter, together with those for two other cryptographic protocols, discussed below.
New types of cryptographic protocols may indeed be devised if the Hilbert space has
more than two dimensions. The reason is that a basis vector may now belong to several
bases. In that case, it is natural to assume that each vector represents a definite trit (0, 1, or
2), which is the same in all the bases to which that vector belongs [13]. An example is given
in the table below, where vectors are labelled green, red, and blue, for later convenience.
TABLE I. Components of 21 unnormalized vectors. The symbols 1¯ and 2¯
stand for −1 and −2, respectively. Orthogonal vectors have different colors.
green 001 101 01¯1 11¯1 11¯2 112 21¯1
red 100 110 101¯ 111¯ 211¯ 211 121¯
blue 010 011 1¯10 1¯11 1¯21 121 1¯12
Although this new algorithm does not improve transmission security (as shown below),
it has many fascinating aspects and leads to new insights into quantum information theory.
The 12 vectors in the first four columns of Table I are shown in Fig. 1, as dots on the faces
of a cube, in a way similar to the graphical representation of a Kochen-Specker uncolorable
set [14]. In the present case, the tricolor analogue of the Kochen-Specker theorem requires
only 13 rays for its proof, because ray (111) is orthogonal to all the rays in the third column,
which have three different colors. These 12 vectors form 13 bases, but only four bases are
complete. The nine others bases have only two vectors each and have to be completed by
nine new vectors, listed in the last three columns of the table. To display these nine vectors
on Fig. 1, their integer components should be divided by 2. The corresponding dots are then
located at the centers of various squares on the faces of the cube.
The cryptographic protocol is the same as before, but now Alice has 21 vectors to choose
from, and Bob has a choice of 13 bases. The essential difference is that these bases are
not mutually unbiased, so that if Eve chooses a different basis (which happens 12/13 of the
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time), she still gets at least probabilistic information on Alice’s vector. It may also happen
that Eve’s basis is different from Bob’s, but both bases contain the vector found by Eve. In
that case, when Bob announces his basis and Alice confirms it, Eve can infer that she got
the correct state and caused no error.
Let us analyze what happens for each successful transmission, that is, when Alice’s vector
|ej〉 is one of those in the basis announced by Bob. Suppose that in her eavesdropping
attempt, Eve obtains a state |eµ〉. This happens with probability Pµj = |〈ej, eµ〉|2. This is
also the probability that Bob gets the correct |ej〉 when Eve resends to him |eµ〉. On the
average over all Alice’s |ej〉 and all Eve’s choices of a basis, the probability that Bob gets a
correct result is
C =
21∑
j=1
21∑
µ=1
Mµ (Pµj)
2/(21× 13), (6)
where Mµ is the number of bases to which |eµ〉 belongs (namely Mµ = 2 for the vectors in
the first and third columns of Table I, Mµ = 3 for those of the second and fourth columns,
and Mµ = 1 for the rest). Bob’s mean error probability is EB = 1− C = 0.385022.
To evaluate Eve’s gain of information IE, we note that when Alice confirms the basis
chosen by Bob, Eve is left with a choice of three vectors having equal prior probabilities,
pj = 1/3. The initial Shannon entropy is Hi = 1 trit, and the prior probability for Eve’s
result µ is
qµ =
2∑
j=0
Pµj pj = 1/3. (7)
It then follows from Bayes’s theorem that the likelihood (posterior probability) of signal j
is (see ref. [14], page 282)
Qjµ = Pµj pj/qµ = Pµj. (8)
The new Shannon entropy, following result µ, is
Hf = −
2∑
j=0
Qjµ log3Qjµ. (9)
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Eve’s information gain is obtained by averaging Hf over all results µ, all Eve’s bases, and
all Bob’s bases. The final result is
IE = Hi − 〈Hf〉, (10)
= 1 +
21∑
j=1
21∑
µ=1
Mj Mµ Pµj log3 Pµj /(3× 132). (11)
Table II lists the relevant data for intercept-and-resend eavesdropping (IRE) on all the above
cryptographic protocols.
TABLE II. Result of IRE on various cryptographic protocols: Eve’s information;
Bob’s information and error rate for a single IRE event; and fraction of eaves-
dropped transmissions needed to make both informations equal to each other.
units bases vectors IE IB EB x
bits 2 4 0.500000 0.188722 0.250000 0.68214
bits 3 6 0.333333 0.081710 0.333333 0.68128
trits 4 12 0.250000 0.053605 0.500000 0.71770
trits 13 12 0.575142 0.143418 0.391738 0.51007
trits 13 21 0.442765 0.150431 0.385022 0.68994
We also investigated the possibility that Alice uses only the 12 vectors in the first four
columns of Table I (those represented by the dots in Fig. 1). The IRE results are also listed
in Table II. However, it is interesting that in this case, Eve can get some information with-
out performing any active eavesdropping and without causing any error, just by passively
listening and waiting for Alice to confirm Bob’s choice of an incomplete basis. Eve then
learns that one of the three trit values is eliminated. On the average, she gets information
IE = (9/13) (1 + log3 2) = 0.255510 trit. (12)
Finally, let us investigate what happens if Eve eavesdrops only on a fraction x of the
particles sent by Alice. In that case, both IE and EB are multiplied by x, and IB is still
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given by Eqs. (4) and (5), with EB replaced by xEB on the right hand side. The results are
displayed in Fig. 2, which also shows the security domain IB ≥ IE , assuming standard error
correction and privacy amplification [9]. The values of x for which IB = IE are listed in
the last column of Table II. We see that the use of four mutually unbiased bases for 3-state
particles requires the highest value of x to breach the security. Moreover, for any given value
of IB, this protocol is the one that gives the lowest value of IE . It thus appears that this
method is the one giving the best results against IRE attacks. It is likely to also be the best
for more sophisticated eavesdropping strategies, but this problem lies beyond the scope of
the present Letter.
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FIG. 1. Twelve vectors are obtained by connecting the center of the cube to the various
dots on its faces (diametrically opposite dots represent the same vector). The four dots at
the vertices of the squares labelled G, R, and B, are green, red and blue, respectively. The
truncated vertex corresponds to the uncolorable ray (111).
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FIG. 2. Mutual informations for the various protocols listed in Table II, when the fraction
of intercepted particles is 0 < x < 1. For the case of 13 bases and 12 vectors, it is assumed
that in the remaining fraction (1 − x), Eve performs passive eavesdropping on incomplete
bases. The data are given in bits for 2-dimensional systems, and trits for 3-dimensional ones.
2-dim., 2 bases [2]
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